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8. Beyond Whole-Of-
Government: Varieties of Place-
Centred Governance 
Professor Ian Marsh 
The prime focus of this report is governance. Whole-of-government is the currently 
favoured administrative design. The previous section discussed the fundamental 
difficulties that afflict present whole-of-government arrangements. In this respect, 
Australian experience matches that of other jurisdictions, which have tried whole-of-
government and found it wanting. In its place, a number of new or supplementary 
frameworks have been introduced to shift the locus of choice and decision away from 
highly centralised arrangements towards more localised contexts. This is reflected both in 
the Total Place initiatives in England and in the attention to place-based approaches in 
current OECD work, which in turn reflects developments in particular states. In both 
cases, the drastic cuts in public spending following the 2008 GFC have coloured 
implementation (e.g. Crowe, 2011). Also relevant are ‘learning-by-doing’ approaches 
which offer a new accountability framework to reconcile national concerns with local 
initiative and freedom of action. Finally, imaginative ‘place-based’ developments, 
covering the provision of otherwise threatened local services and the realisation of 
efficiencies through collaboration between authorities at the local level, are also evident 
in Australia. These are detailed in a comprehensive report on local government RAPAD, 
2007).  These varied governance design are reviewed in turn. A concluding section 
explores the consistency of these approaches with recent official reviews of the public 
sector in Australia.  
1 The Big Society in Britain. 
David Cameron’s Conservative Party won a majority of seats in the general election of 
May 2010 but not sufficient to form a government. His subsequent coalition with the 
Liberal-Democrat Nick Clegg was based on a formal agreement of which The Big Society 
was a key part. The agreement foreshadowed a series of decentralising actions including: 
a review of local government finance; reform of the planning system; the end of ring-
fenced grants and Comprehensive Area Assessments; the establishment of directly elected 
Mayors in 12 English cities; the creation of a ‘general power of competence’ for local 
authorities, and new powers for communities to takeover threatened local facilities and to 
bid to operate services that are now provided by public authorities; new powers to 
instigate local referendums; more scope for mutual’s, cooperatives and social enterprises 
in running public services; and the establishment of a Big Society Bank. 
In the first instance, these broad commitments have been implemented via changes in the 
remit of central departments and through several specific programs. Apart from the Prime 
Minister and his Deputy who (as party leaders) carry prime responsibility for what is the 
government’s principal domestic initiative, three ministers are leading implementation: 
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the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, who heads the eponymous 
department (DCLC); the Minister for Decentralisation who has a broad remit for 
decentralisation measures across government and is located in DCLC21; in addition a 
Minister in the Cabinet Office has overall responsibility for Big Society measures 
particularly as they affect the civil service, social enterprises, volunteering etc and a 
division with specific responsibilities in these areas has been established in that 
department.  
In so far as it concerns the effectiveness of public services, The Big Society draws on 
strong empirical grounds: as we will see, it is powerfully justified by political, social and 
fiscal evidence. However, as will be clear from earlier discussion of the miscarriage of our 
own whole-of-government efforts, it also presents profound challenges to existing highly 
centralised governance arrangements. This includes, not least: how to preserve central 
influence on overall economic and fiscal management; how to persuade central 
departments and ministers to let go authority; and how to defuse media driven crises and 
reframe political accountability. These may not be insuperable problems. But the designs 
that might reconcile more decentralised responsibilities with desired central capabilities 
have yet to be worked through. As will be discussed in a later section, there are putative 
solutions  – for example, ‘learning-by-doing’ designs offer one novel solution (on page 84) 
- but in moving to a new more decentralised governance configuration it would be self-
defeating to underestimate their scale.22  
Decentralised governance represents a deliberate shift away from the top-down pattern 
which was common to both the Thatcher-Major and Blair-Brown governments. In 
particular, the Blair-Brown years were marked by substantially increased investment in 
the public sector and the development of arrangements to enhance central control but in 
conjunction with whole-of-government delivery at the local level. Organisational 
arrangements to buttress central control and to drive service improvement included 
special units in the Cabinet Office to facilitate strategy development and to drive program 
change. In addition, the performance framework was extended with a plethora of targets 
                                                        
21 The now Minister, Greg Clark wrote a book in 2003 which he describes as making the case that 
‘if central government is everywhere, then local government is nowhere’ (Total Politics: Labour’s 
Command State, London: Conservative Policy Unit, 2003). 
22 For example, in their report on the Localism Bill the Communities and Local Government Select 
Committee pointed to the lack of a coherent framework which would indicate how the various 
measures might fit together: ‘It is surprising that we have not come across a coherent, 
comprehensive vision of how public services and local democracy will change in response to the 
Government’s agenda’ para 21, p. 13. Later they noted the somewhat paradoxical situation in 
which an agenda designed to promote decentralisation was introduced without any consultation 
with the interests who would implement it: ‘The views of those outside government about how the 
policy should be defined have not obviously been taken into account. We recommend that the 
government undertake a formal consultation to gather the views of local government and other 
stakeholders about what sort of localism they would like to see.’  Para 32. P.18 
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and measures. To facilitate joined-up working, Joint Funding Agreements were also 
introduced. There is an extensive literature on all these development (e.g. Barber, 2008; 
Marsh and Miller, 2012, esp. Chps. 3 and 4).  
The profound limitations of this experience fanned interest in more radically 
decentralised approaches. An early move occurred in 2006 when the Lyons review of local 
government proposed attention to place based approaches. In subsequent years, within 
and beyond government, attention to alternatives flourished. Think tanks have been 
important contributors to the emerging agenda (e.g. ResPublica, 2008, 2009; Demos 
(Wind-Cowie),  2010 ; IPPR 2010 a, b, c, 2008; NESTA, 2011; The Young Foundation, 
2010 ; the Institute for Government, 2011; new economics foundation, 2010). In addition, 
the House of Commons Public Administration Committee and the Communities and Local 
Government Committee have reviewed aspects of the new approach (HC 547, 2011). The 
number and variety of these sources indicates the vitality of this extra-mural policy 
discussion in the UK, a point which is relevant later when we consider the very limited 
extra-mural engagement in strategic policy development in Australia   
The government has since taken several steps to advance its decentralising agenda. These 
include commitments to create elective Police Commissioners for each police area with 
responsibilities for overall strategy and public liaison, but in conjunction with Chief 
Constables. In addition, following a program introduced by Tony Blair, incentives for the 
creation of citizen or community-controlled schools (school academies) have been further 
developed and there are proposals to decentralise health administration – although these 
are now stalled as a result of political reactions. The government also abolished a variety 
of regional administrative structures.  
But the most significant step so far involves the Localism Bill introduced in December 
2010. The details will be reviewed shortly. But the general case for this approach was 
powerfully developed in the report Total Place published jointly by the Treasury and the 
Communities and Local Government Department (March 2010). The following quotes 
from this report document the basic case for change: 
‘Resource mapping demonstrated the complexity of funding streams. A pilot 
conducted over 2009 in 13 areas, which focused on social development spending, 
covered $82 billion, approximately one-fifth of the total public spend in England. The 
per-capita spends ranged from L6000 in one area to just on L9000 in another. These 
differences reflect variations in relative deprivation. The pilots ‘exposed the 
complexity of the ‘internal wiring’ of public service delivery. The large number of 
individual grants and poorly aligned objectives of similar services across different 
policy areas can limit the ability of delivery organisations to join up services around 
users.’ 
A citizen viewpoint shows how public services are often impersonal, fragmented and 
unnecessarily complex. For example, the Leicester and Lancashire survey identified 
almost 450 face-to-face service points, 65 separate call centres plus 75 web sites 
providing customer services. In Lewisham’s the survey identified 120 projects or 
programs providing various forms of support to workless and unemployed people. The 
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Bradford review concluded: ‘By adopting the culture of people and place rather than 
organisation and/or department at a central or local level we can significantly change 
the way public services are accessed and delivered.’  
The system currently driving the delivery of public services is overly complex. Cross 
organisational working at the local level requires governance and accountability 
regimes which align the approaches of different auditors, inspectors, managers and 
national and local political leaders. Template protocols for pooled budgets and other 
joint working arrangements are being developed. Local authorities currently report 
performance against 188 indicators. For frontline services one authority reported 
against 706 measures and another against 930 measures! Reporting can also be on 
different metrics. For example the Police Department and a Youth Offending Team in 
Bradford measured the number of first time offenders differently – but both 
organisations need to work together to deliver outcomes. 
Individuals and families with complex needs impose significant costs in areas but in 
most cases they are currently not tackled through targeted or preventative activities. 
The pilots demonstrated that much current public spending was focused on 
consequences not the causes of complex problems. Other research demonstrated the 
very substantial costs (and the potential savings) in moving families from ‘chaotic’ 
(L49, 425 per child) to ‘barely coping’ (L6527 per child) and then to ‘coping categories 
(L643 per child). The pilots indicated that in order to target services, the involvement 
of a wide range of organisations was needed to ‘wrap’ services around the individual. 
Sharing data proved to be a particular problem. For example, one Family Intervention 
Project involved a single case worker who helped families with multiple problems to 
get the help they needed. The problems encountered included crime, anti-social 
behaviour, attendance/behaviour problems and evictions. Treated separately, costs 
were estimated to be ten-times larger’ (Total Place, various pages). 
The purpose of the Localism Bill was to ‘devolve greater powers to councils and 
neighbourhoods and give local communities control over housing and planning decisions’.  
The core elements of the Localism Bill were: 
 Regional Strategies: Hitherto a variety of top down and Whitehall based targets 
and procedures have framed local decision making. These are abolished.  
 General Power of Competence: Local authorities are empowered to do anything 
that is not specifically prohibited by law. 
 Communities’ right to buy: The Bill gives local communities the power to bid for 
local assets threatened with closure and to bid for the ownership and management 
of community assets. In addition, community organisations will have greater 
opportunities to bid for assets where these are essential or them to deliver existing 
or new services. Public services will also be encouraged to seek offers from staff 
who want to take over and run services constituted as employee-led mutuals. 
 Neighbourhood plans: The Bill reforms the planning system by extending the rights 
of communities in planning processes. 
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 Spending: Much of the spending provided directly by central government via 
general grants remained ring-fenced. Most of these restrictions are to be 
progressively abolished. The move to community budgets which enable local areas 
to pool funds from different programs is also foreshadowed to be completed by 
2013. 
 Community Right to Challenge: The Bill incorporates a right for communities to 
challenge to run local authority services  
 Participation: Opportunities for local referenda are extended. The Bill introduces 
elected Mayors for the ten largest English cities. 
Two Parliamentary Committees have since held extensive hearings on this Bill (Public Bill 
Committee, January to march 2011; Communities and Local Government Committee, 
HC547, 7 June 2011). Evidence to both committees covered issues which were seen to 
remain unresolved despite the government’s stated intentions. These included: 
 Bundled funds and Community Budgets: ‘Community Budgets’ covering services 
for at risk families are currently being trialed in 16 areas and being considered for 
a further 34. To work successfully significant funds that now flow via siloed 
departmentally based programs, would need to be bundled into single grant and 
devolved to an authority with appropriate governance capacities and public 
legitimacy. Total Place analyses indicated that approximately 70% of public 
founding for individual services came from three departments – Health, Works and 
Pensions and Education. The foreshadowed trials will only involve about 10% of the 
total funds. Further, since the change of government other new measures would 
seem to undercut the ability to bundle funds at the lowest appropriate spatial level. 
For example, the Department of Works and Pensions has reorganised welfare-to-
work into a single Work Program, which is being administered centrally on the 
basis of regional contracts. Local government has been excluded from direct 
participation in these arrangements, thus complicating the development of context 
specific employment and developmental programs at the local level (see later 
references to OECD reports on the desirability of creating at appropriate spatial 
levels whole-system employment and development capabilities). 
 The ‘right to challenge’. Charities, social enterprises and co-operatives (but not so 
far for-profit providers) are accorded the opportunity to challenge to operate 
services now channelled through local government. For example, this might cover 
offender and community services, social care etc. This builds on a consultation 
Green Paper issued in October 2010 (Building a stronger civil society) in which the 
Government foreshadowed a much expanded scope for non-government bodies to 
bid for the delivery of public services. A White Paper had been promised for 
February 2011 however it has been delayed - according to press reports as a result 
of differences within the coalition about the relative emphasis on community 
involvement versus for-profit providers. The tensions surrounding choices between 
local and for-profit provision were succinctly expressed in evidence to the 
Communities and Local Government Committee by Voice4Change England: ‘Whilst 
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localism and devolution of power to communities can support public service 
reform, it is not a given that public service reform supports localism. If proposals 
on opening up public services are not managed properly then it is not local 
businesses or charities that will take over services but large corporations’. The 
government is committed to ensuring ‘social value in the local area’ is taken into 
account in benefit-cost calculations but has yet to define how this will be valued. A 
metric for calculating ‘local social value’ will also be critical to facilitate evaluation.  
 Localism requires new analytic tools to determine appropriate spatial scales and to 
properly value ‘community development’ and on-going innovation. The government 
has yet to develop a methodology that would allow an analysis of the relative merits 
of different spatial levels of service provision or one to assess the value of 
‘community development’ or on-going innovation.  
 For example, there is no automatic coincidence between a scale that maximises 
economic efficiency, a scale that is most likely to encourage innovation and a scale 
that is most likely to encourage economic and community development and job 
creation. Spatial levels for employment, economic development, infrastructure, 
social development, and policing, schooling and primary health care do not 
automatically coincide (see later discussion of this point in relation to 
collaboration between local authorities in Australia, pp. 88-89) 
 Moreover, the government is committed to ensuring that ‘social value in the local 
area’ is taken into account but has yet to define how this will be accomplished. 
Similarly, it has not developed an approach that would allow potential for 
innovation, which is a key element of the case for change, to be incorporated in 
analyses.23 One approach may promise an immediate benefit but another may offer 
one that is unfolding and perhaps more uncertain. A fair metric or framework to 
evaluate such alternatives is required. This also spills into accountability processes 
since any measures would be pertinent both at the both initiation and evaluation 
ends of the exercise.  
 Freer Use of Grant Funds: The government has rolled more funds into Area-Based 
Grants for local authorities and proposes to add more as the program develops. The 
aim is to create more flexibility in how the money is spent by a community – but 
what if the local decision is to divert funds to other purposes? Take Supporting 
People’s Grants. These provide housing-related support for vulnerable adults. 
Different stakeholders reacted differently to the government’s proposal to return 
this money to general funds. Local government representatives welcomed it. NGOs 
representing the individuals involved were much more guarded. The government 
has not explained how it will ensure equity for the most marginalised or most 
                                                        
23 Schumpeter’s paradox of competition is pertinent: ‘A system that at every point of time fully 
utilises its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a system that 
does so at no given point in time, because the latter’s failure to do so many be a condition for the 
level or speed of long run performance’. 
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needy or least articulate. Minimum national standards and enhanced transparency 
and scrutiny capabilities may be a way – but they have yet to be enacted. 
 Political accountability: The Bill envisages devolving wider responsibility for 
public service provision to local levels but does not address issues of political 
accountability. Despite the government rhetoric, there are already gross examples 
of governmental reaction under media pressure to highly local issues. 
 Coordination at local levels: The relationship between the various components of 
localism remains ill-defined. For example, the government’s proposed reform for 
policing and schools devolve responsibility to other bodies with no incentives to 
link activities at the community level. Where does the expansion of school 
academies, GP commissioning and elected police commissioners leave the role of 
local government? A more diverse range of elected authorities and autonomous 
service provider complicates the task of ensuring approaches are strategic or joined 
up at the community level.  
In evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee, Professor George Jones 
underlined the depth of the challenge that decentralisation presents to the dominant 
centralised ethos:  
‘Centralism pervades the legislation on the localism proposals. …….The Local 
Government Association has calculated there are at least 142 order and regulation-
making provisions, in addition to the 405 pages in the Act, with its 208 clauses and 
25 schedules. One foresees the forthcoming Act being accompanied by panoply of 
regulations and orders, as well as by almost endless pages of guidance, as the 
centre seeks to determine what should be done locally, rather than the local 
authority which knows local conditions and is accountable locally. ……. 
14. It is as if central government knows no other way to act than through command 
and control enforcing detailed prescription. Yet localism will develop only if 
centralism in the culture and processes of central government is effectively 
challenged. ………. 
15. Centralism pervades central government in forming its attitudes and 
determining its procedures and practices. It draws strength from the culture of the 
various departments of central government, which do not trust local authorities to 
run their own affairs and know no other way to deal with them than through 
regulation and detailed guidance designed to ensure they act in ways determined 
by the centre. Departmental attitudes are reinforced by ministers who have their 
own views as to how local authorities should act and wish to require them to act in 
that way. ……………. 
17. Past experience suggests that ministerial words calling for localism do not 
translate into localism in practice because of the dominance of centralism in 
central government. Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State in 1979, announced a 
bonfire of 300 controls, but the centralist culture remained unchallenged and over 
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time new controls were introduced, more than replacing those abolished. The 
Labour government often set out policies for decentralization to local authorities 
but the reality was detailed control in targets, inspection, prescriptions and 
guidance. There is no better illustration of this approach than the at least twelve 
regulations, five directions and nearly two hundred pages of guidance specifying 
exactly how local authorities should introduce new political structures, virtually all 
of which will remain in force after the Localism Bill becomes law. 
18. ………. Unless challenged the culture of centralism will prevent localism 
becoming more than words from a Minster or in a White Paper as has happened in 
the past. If the Government wants, as it asserts, to see localism developed in 
practice, it must recognise the need for changes in the attitudes and practice of the 
departments of central government. Words by themselves will not be sufficient. 
Measures are required to entrench localism 
Ideas advanced in the Bill hearings may have wider application. One involved the creation 
Public Service Boards, which could be established at an appropriate opportunity-focused 
spatial level. They could be composed of existing elected council members and nominated 
members representing both other community bodies and central government agencies and 
departments. Their role would be to allocate resources and commission services from 
other public bodies. These Boards could also be accorded the right to bid to manage 
resources that are now allocated by central or state departments on a regionalised or local 
basis. For example, unemployment, policing, welfare and educational programs might be 
opened to bids to bundle money and reassign resources according to local priorities and 
needs. This would require the creation of a separate authority both to adjudicate such 
bids and to ensure accountability.  
The British initiatives involve decentralising proposals in a familiar political culture and 
institutional setting. Another approach is explored in a number of current and recent 
OECD reports. These suggest that, in further developing effectiveness in the provision of 
public services, place based approaches are the primary candidate. These analyses are 
summarised in the next section. 
2. Place-based Approaches in Recent OECD Work.  
The extent and variety of place-based approaches in recent OECD studies indicate the 
emergent appeal of this framework. In the quest for sustainable economic development, 
jobs and the effective provision of public services, the establishment of context-specific 
capabilities are seen to be primary. They represent the next move in the development of 
public management. Place-based approaches are suggested for a variety of contexts 
including economic development and innovation, social development, city and rural 
development, unemployment, deprived areas and high needs contexts. This is indicated in 
the following list of recent studies (with additional studies listed in the footnote): 
 Managing Accountability and Flexibility in Labour Market Policy(2011) 
 Breaking out of Policy Silos: Doing more with less (2010) 
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 Strategies to Improve Rural Service Delivery (2010) 
 Regions Matter: Economic Recovery, Innovation and Sustainable Growth (2009) 
 How Regions Grow: Trends and Analysis (2009) 
 Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007) 
 Governing Regional Development Policy: The Use of Indicators (2009) 
 Flexible Policy for More and Better Jobs (2009) 
 Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007) 
 The New Rural paradigm: Policies and Governance (2006)24 
One proposition is common to these reports: whilst it is paramount to get institutions 
right at the local or regional level, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. According to one 
OECD analyst: ‘In many countries, the regional/central vertical governance gap is 
significant: the centre faces information gaps and the regions confront capacity gaps. 
Moreover, it makes little sense to speak of ‘centralisation’ or decentralisation in general – 
the details are always the key’ (William Coleman, Presentation to Australian MPs, 
October, 2010). Historic, institutional and local characteristics should shape governance 
designs. For example, in relation to development, the emphasis is on differentiated 
strategies and organisational designs which can detect and then exploit existing or 
potential niches or opportunities. Implicit in all of the foregoing is the key role of local 
engagement and empowerment.   
In designing place-based arrangements, the OECD has developed two frameworks. The 
first sets out systematically the seven core dimensions of a governance system: 
information; capacity; funding; policy; administration; objectives; accountability (Mind 
the Gaps – A Tool for Diagnosis, see Table 1 following). These individual elements are 
defined as follows (Chairbit, 2011 a and b): 
‘i. An information gap is characterised by information asymmetries between levels of 
government when designing, implementing and delivering public policies. Sometimes the 
information gap results from strategic behaviours of public actors who may prefer not to 
reveal too clearly their strengths and weaknesses, especially if allocation of responsibility 
is associated with conditional granting. However, it is often the case that the very 
                                                        
24 Delivering Local Development through a Comprehensive Approach to Strategy, System and 
Leadership – Highlighting the Case of Derry-Londonderry, Northern Ireland (2011); New 
Approaches to Rural Policy: lesson for Around the World (2005); The New Rural Paradigm, 
Policies and Governance (2006); OECD Territorial Reviews, France (2006); Job Rich Growth: 
Strategies for Local Employment, Skills Development and Social Protection (2011); OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Outlook (2010) 
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information about territorial specificities is not perceived by the central decision maker 
whilst sub national actors may be ignorant about capital objectives and strategies. 
ii. The capacity challenge arises when there is a lack of human, knowledge or 
infrastructural resources available to carry out tasks, regardless of the level of 
government (even if, in general sub national governments are considered to be suffering 
more from such difficulties than central government. 
iii. The fiscal gap is represented by the difference between territorial revenues and the 
required expenditures to meet local responsibilities and implement appropriate 
development strategies. In a more dynamic perspective, fiscal difficulties also include 
mismatch between budget practices and policy needs: in the absence of multi-annual 
budget practices for example, local authorities may face uncertainty in engaging in 
appropriate spending, and/or face a lack of flexibility in spending despite its 
appropriateness in uncertain contexts. Too strict earmarking of grants may also impede 
appropriate fungibility of resources and limit ability to deliver adapted policies. 
iv. The policy challenge results when line ministries take a purely vertical approach to be 
implemented at the territorial level. By contrast, local authorities are best to customise 
complementarities between policy fields and concretise cross-sectional approaches. 
Limited coordination among line ministries may provoke a heavy administrative burden, 
different timing and agenda in managing correlated actions etc. It can even lead to strong 
inconsistencies when objectives of sectoral policy-makers are contradictory. 
v. The administrative gap occurs when the administrative scale for policy making, in 
terms of spending as well as strategic planning, is not in line with relevant functional 
areas. A very common case concerns municipal fragmentation which can lead jurisdictions 
to initiate ineffective public action by not benefitting from economies of scale. Some 
specific policies also require very specific and often naturally fixed, boundaries. 
vi. The objective gap refers to different rationalities from national and sub-national 
policy-makers which create obstacles for adopting convergent strategies. Common 
examples arise from political and departmental purposes. Divergences across levels of 
government can be used for ‘cornering’ the debate instead of serving common purposes. A 
local mayor may prefer to serve constituents perceived aspirations instead of aligning 
decisions to national or state wide objectives which may be perceived as contradictory. 
vii. The accountability challenge results from the difficulty to ensure transparency of 
practices across different constituencies and levels of government. It also concern 
possible integrity challenges of policy makers involved in the management of public 
investment.’ 
These ‘gaps’ together constitute the architecture that is essential for effective place 
designs. In the absence of appropriate arrangements in any one building block, the entire 
design of place governance is put at risk. In turn, this emphasises the significance of a 
diagnostic phase in which local conditions, needs and circumstances need to be clearly 
identified. 
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The second framework, Bridging the Coordination and Capacity Gaps (Table 2), illustrates 
the approaches adopted in various states to overcome coordination and capacity gaps. A 
particular state might use various combinations of these instruments, depending on what 
it seeks to achieve through decentralisation and what coordination and capacity gaps are 
relevant. The key point again is the variety of approaches that are evident around OECD 
states and the specifically ‘local’ character of any particular design.  
Because of the importance of employment as the key to social development, particularly in 
deprived areas, economic development is a particular concern. This involves an initial 
strategic focus on economic opportunities. There is however no unambiguous empirical 
evidence concerning drivers of growth at regional levels or indeed about the propensity of 
different types of regions to grow. ‘A large number of urban regions grow faster than the 
average rural region, but many rural regions grow faster than the urban average. Hence 
opportunities for growth exist in all types of regions……. Human capital and innovation 
are positively correlated with growth and infrastructure influences growth only when 
human capital and innovation are present…… Agglomeration also influences growth.’  The 
presentation noted that these findings omit important interaction effects and that many 
policy interventions can have unintended effects if undertaken in isolation. ‘If this implies 
a constraint in terms of policy coherence, it also points to opportunities arising from 
policy complementarities’ (Seminar for Visiting Australian MPs. OECD, 8 October 2010)  
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Mind the Gaps : a Tool for a Diagnosis
Administrative gap  “Mismatch” between functional areas and administrative boundaries => Need for 
instruments for reaching “effective size”  
Information gap  Asymmetries of information (quantity, quality, type) between different 
stakeholders, either voluntary or not => Need for instruments for revealing & 
sharing information 
Policy gap Sectoral fragmentation across ministries and agencies => Need for mechanisms to 
create multidimensional/systemic approaches, and to exercise political 
leadership and commitment.  
Capacity gap Insufficient scientific, technical, infrastructural capacity of local actors => Need for 
instruments to build capacity  
Funding gap Unstable or insufficient revenues undermining effective implementation of 
responsibilities at subnational level or for crossing policies => Need for shared 
financing mechanisms  
Objective gap Different rationalities creating obstacles for adopting convergent targets  => Need 
for instruments to align objectives 
Accountability gap Difficulty to ensure the transparency of practices across the different 
constituencies => Need for institutional quality instruments 
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Bridge the coordination and capacity gaps
Contracts France, Italy, European Union,  Canada
Performance Measurement & Transparent 
evaluation 
Norway , United Kingdom, United States 
Grants, co‐funding agreements All countries: general purpose grants v. earmarked, equalisation 
mechanisms  
Strategic planning requirements, Multi‐annual 
budget  
Along with investment contracts
Inter‐municipal coordination  Mergers (Denmark, Japan) v. inter‐municipal cooperation 
(Spain, France, Brazil etc.)  
Inter‐sectoral collaboration  Finland, France …
One ministry v. interministerial mechanisms  
Agencies United Kingdom, Canada, Chile 
Experimentation policies Sweden,  United States, Finland 
Legal mechanisms and standard settings All countries, but more or less implemented
Citizens’ participation A question of degree
Private sector participation  From strategy design… to vested interest
Institutional capacity indicators Italy for sub‐national level
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In relation to rural and remote regions, the following are suggested as key messages 
from recent surveys and conferences:  
 Investment priorities for rural development – uniformity in service delivery 
is not an option. Differences in opportunities and characteristics between 
regions suggest investment requirements will differ. Provision should build 
back from strategies that are devised at regional levels.   
 Innovative rural regions: human capital development, financial support and 
ICT are all important – no less critical is how take-up is embedded and 
orchestrated (see later discussion of Regional Innovation Systems). 
 Innovative service delivery: meeting the challenges of rural regions – Service 
delivery is a key to rural development. National minimum standards may 
apply, but modes of delivery can vary widely between regions. 
The work on rural development has culminated in what the OECD describes as a 
paradigm shift in regional policy with a switch from compensatory and 
redistributive approaches to arrangements that can identify and capitalise on 
opportunities on a progressively unfolding basis: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This attention to economic opportunities is reinforced in literatures on regional 
innovation systems to which we now turn. 
3. Regional Innovation Systems 
Innovation shifts the focus of economic strategy from markets to capabilities. Fully 
assimilated, this represents another fundamental paradigm shift. The concept of 
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regional innovation is the heart of this new frame. This is because capabilities 
develop at regional not economy-wide levels. This approach has gained in currency 
in Australia as a response to at least three developments:  
 A slackening of productivity growth in Australia from the late 1990s which 
persisted into the early twenty-first century. 
 Increased intensity of international competitiveness in a globalising 
economy; 
 A switch in focus from the development of economy-wide market structures 
to the development of region-specific capabilities; 
A region is the key unit for research and action because capabilities develop only at 
this spatial level. Capabilities which are inherently ‘local’ in character create 
competitive advantages. This involves specialised resources, skills, institutions and 
locations which share in common social and cultural values, competencies and 
learning processes (surveyed in Asheim and Gertler, 2005; also Lipsey, Carlaw and 
Bekar, 2005). They also include institutional endowments, built structures, 
knowledge and skills (e.g. see West 2009, for an exposition of this approach in the 
context of regional Tasmania). There is an extensive literature on the contribution 
of cluster strategies to this outcome (Porter, 1998; Dunning, 1997). 
In contrast to a top-down ‘picking winners’ approach, regional development occurs 
as localised capabilities are mobilised. Regions gain competitive advantage by 
mobilising all their assets including institutional and governmental ones. For 
example, this might involve infrastructure (including education, communications, 
logistics etc) or commercial capabilities (such as finance). Where gaps are 
identified, appropriate infrastructure needs to be sought. Key platforms to develop 
these outcomes include: clustering and broader network collaborations, often 
involving leadership by industry or community associations. The Australian wine 
industry provides a classic example of this process (Smith and Marsh, 2009).  
The outcome is a Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS), which becomes a platform for 
building a provisional consensus around the steps that need to be taken to realise 
opportunities (e.g. high-potential sectors like culture, tourism, environmental 
management etc). For example, specific examples in the Tasmanian context include 
Coal River Valley development; the North West Regional Alliance; and the Dorset 
Pilot.25                          
Where capabilities depend on distributed knowledge (as distinct from that wholly 
developed internally by an individual commercial actor), RIS analysis is particularly 
                                                        
25 West Jonathan, 2009, An economic strategy for Tasmania, University of Tasmania: 
Australian Innovation Research Centre 
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concerned with the structures that are required to develop and disseminate 
appropriate or context-specific knowledge.  
Social conditions are another key element. Innovation and regional development 
require an assessment of the population and settlement patterns most likely to 
support development in a particular location and the social infrastructure required 
to support such populations.  
4. EU ‘learning-by-doing’, experimentalist or pragmatist governance: 
The EU is a complex multi-level governance design for which it is hard to find 
precedents. In areas where common action has been agreed the diversity of 
approaches and structures between member states ruled out top-down or one-size-
fits-all designs. So how could action be co-ordinated? In answering this latter 
question, the EU has introduced an approach which may have applications to co-
ordinated action between and within levels of government in Australia, specifically 
in the context of remote Australia.  
The EU approach replaces principal-agent designs with a ‘learning-by-doing’ or 
pragmatist one (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010). The former design continues to dominate 
public policy thinking in Australia (e.g. Marsh and Spies-Butcher, 2009). A central 
tenet of principal-agent theory is that the principal can determine desired outcomes 
in advance. Pre-determined performance metrics allow the principal to hold the 
agent accountable for outcomes, thus obviating shirking, opportunism or other 
deceptive behaviour on the part of the agent. This has been widely applied in public 
sector settings in Australia, for example in a variety of human services contracts. 
But the diversity of conditions across the country has required adaptation. Hence in 
equalising comparisons the centre adds in a variety of qualifying factors that it 
considers appropriate. Influenced by this thinking, elaborate contractual, co-
production, outsourcing and reporting structures have developed in a variety of 
fields (e.g. surveyed in Productivity Commission, 2010) 
At least three basic features of human service (and other) contexts undercut advance 
determination of outcomes by a centrally located principal: 
• First, the knowledge guiding the decisions of both principals and agents is 
provisional. 
Both are operating with corrigible information and judgements. Unintended 
consequences, ambiguity and difference abound. It is impossible to devise programs 
from first principles that survive the effort to realise them. In the case of the 
principal, this involves judgements about attainable outcomes and, in the case of 
agents this involves judgements about the practices most likely to enhance 
performance in the pursuit of these outcomes. 
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• Second, providers have information that is essential to adapting performance 
outcomes 
for the overall system that recognise best practice. The principal is setting outcomes 
that need to reconcile efficiency and quality in a way that minimises incentives for 
provider gamesmanship, creates incentives for efficiency and that does so in a way 
that also promotes quality services for clients. Any one of the outcomes is complex. 
Their achievement in combination is a daunting challenge. Only the providers have 
information that is relevant to making this latter judgement. The principal needs 
routine access to provider information in order to refine and develop her 
understanding of desired outcomes in the light of provider and client experience. 
• Third, providers’ own knowledge of how to attain quality services for clients is 
varied and developing. Providers own knowledge of how best to serve clients – and 
how best to establish organisational and governance routines that reinforce these 
outcomes, is itself corrigible and experimental. Different organisations will attain 
different outcomes and it will not be immediately apparent which represents the 
best achievement of not necessarily consistent purposes. Dynamic efficiency 
through the whole system thus requires the routine collection, assessment and 
dissemination of performance information amongst providers.  
An ‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach represents an alternative to these 
architectures – but one that promises to shift exchanges from a primarily punitive 
to a primarily learning basis (Sabel 2006, 2007). This builds on earlier work on 
continuous performance improvement and ‘learning by doing’ – an approach to 
dynamic efficiency that was developed by the Toyota Motor Company in its 
management of buyer-supplier relationships (Sabel 1992). Here is how this might be 
translated to public policy settings: ‘General goals or designs are set provisionally 
by the highest level – parliament, a regulatory authority, or the relevant corporate 
executives . . . then the provisional goals are revised in the light of proposals by 
lower level units responsible for executing key aspects of the overall task  (Sabel, 
2006:11). 
Sabel proposes to recast fundamentally the terms of the accountability relationship 
between principals and agents: 
‘Compliance or accountability in the principal agent sense of rule following is 
impossible. There are in effect no fixed rules, or, what comes to the same 
thing, a key rule is to continuously evaluate possible changes in the rules. 
Accountability thus requires not comparison of performance to a goal or 
rule, but reason giving: actors in the new institutions are called upon to 
explain their use of the autonomy they are accorded in pursuing the 
corrigible goals (our italics). These accounts enable evaluation of their 
choices in the light of explanations provided by actors in similar 
circumstances making different ones and vice versa.’ 
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Sabel’s approach also alters the frequency and the substance of the exchange 
between principals and agents: 
‘To encourage this kind of ongoing mutual reflection monitoring is 
continuous, or nearly so, rather than occasional or episodic: and it is less 
concerned with outcome measures than with diagnostic information – 
information that can redirect the course of ‘treatment’.  
Finally and critically, it also alters the patterning of carrots and sticks. Sabel 
envisages that agents who fail to perform to best-practice levels will be first given 
the chance to improve via an exchange of knowledge about their potential to 
improve. ‘When failure to follow the rule in principal-agent systems is, in theory, 
immediately penalised, in pragmatist systems non-compliance in the sense of 
inability or unwillingness to improve or otherwise respond to change at an 
acceptable rate triggers . . . increased capacity enhancing assistance from the 
oversight authority. Repeated failure to respond, even with assistance, is, however, 
likely to bring about the dissolution of the offending unit’ (Sabel 2006:14). 
This broad approach has been widely tested in a variety of human services and other 
public policy settings in the United States including teaching disadvantaged 
students (Liebman and Sabel 2003); defence contracting (Dorf and Sabel 1998:332), 
environmental regulation (Dorf and Sabel 1998:373), nuclear regulatory safety (Dorf 
and Sabel 1998:370), policing in deprived neighbourhoods (Dorf and Sabel 
1998:327), occupational health and safety (Dorf and Sabel 1998:358) etc.  
Pragmatist or experimental principles define an approach to the management of 
inter-governmental and purchaser-provider relations wholly different from the 
structure that is now dominant in federal and state jurisdictions. Earlier sections 
explored the fit between the present whole-of-government architecture and 
outcomes in remote Australia. Empirical evidence concerning the structural 
impedimenta to these arrangements was also reviewed. The alternative 
‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach to system design avoids these difficulties. 
It builds on a broad structure of inter-governmental and purchaser-provider 
relationship, but places exchange in a context that emphasises learning by both 
parties. This approach merits consideration not only because it would encourage 
continuous performance improvement but also because it promises to transcend 
difficulties that have consistently worked against reform. 
5. Australian Local Government Practice. 
The foregoing discussion focused on regions as the relevant spatial unit and 
involved governance models drawn from international practice. Parallel 
experiments and possibilities are also evident in Australian local government 
practice. The models that have been developed here have clear implications for 
imagining various possible forms of regional governance. These local government 
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arrangements are comprehensively explored in a report of the collaborative 
practices of shires in remote Queensland (Dollery and Johnson, 2007).  
The report documents the many imaginative responses of individual Councils to 
preserve community amenities and to reconcile local responsiveness with efficient 
resource management and relationships with other levels of government. The focus 
of the report is the Remote Area Planning and Development Board (RAPAD) which 
is a not-for-profit ASIC listed company involving a collaboration of 11 councils in 
Western Queensland. According to the report: ‘The RAPAD mission is to “plan, 
facilitate and encourage sustainable growth for the future of Outback 
Queensland….It intends achieving this by: 
 Being future oriented 
 Being a consultative advocate and lobbyist 
 Proactively working and networking with all shires as well as private and 
public sector organisations 
 Adding value to individual shires and other regional organisations in a non-
duplicative manner 
 Coordinating and facilitating the provision of relevant research to their 
region 
 Supporting all miners and their respective communities”’ 
Its core concerns are transport, regional planning, capacity building, natural 
resource management, service development, technology and communications, 
development of sustainable industries and investment attraction. 
The report documents the many imaginative roles that are being undertaken by the 
individual councils to ensure community amenities are maintained at desired 
standards: ‘In the absence of any other feasible service providers, local councils 
must provide a large range of essentials services. For instance, there are not many 
councils in Australia that provide the postal services (as in Barcoo and Ilfracombe); 
offer banking facilities (Blackall, Boulia, Tambo and Winton); a café (as in Boulia, 
Isisford and Winton); undertaker services (Barcoo, Blackall, Boulia, Ilfracombe and 
Tambo); real estate agency activities (Diamentina); operate general stores 
(Ilfracombe and Isisford); provide freight services (Isisford); or operate the local 
newspaper (Blackall)…In addition, each council provides extensive support to the 
numorous community and sporting organisations in their boundaries’(p. 104) 
Other services include: 
‘ ..Aramac Shire either directly or indirectly provides…a bakery, Home and 
Community Care programs, and a rural transaction centre. Similarly, 
Barcaldine Shire delivers a number of state government programs including 
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rural family support, 60 and Better, Home Assist Secure and a HACC 
program……BARCO Shire Council provides the Jundah Post Office….the 
Council provides a bus service and a 4WD vehicle for  the three schools in the 
Shire; the Council provided land for the Windorah Medical Clinic; it provided 
land for state community housing; it has undertaker services and provides 
burial services…..Barcoo Shire has set up a bursary system for residents 
undertaking tertiary, diploma or trade qualifications…….Blackall Shire assist 
its residents by providing an ‘in-store’ Westpac Bank facility in the Council 
office and it acts as a ‘developer’ baby providing an industrial estate as well 
as residential land for sale…..(it) runs an extensive local economic 
development program….an airport (with 3 commercial flights a week); SBS 
radio transmission; youth development services, including employment 
initiatives’ (p 105-106). 
Earlier, the report discussed at least seven ways common services might be provided 
by collaboration between local communities: 
i.. Ad hoc resource sharing: ‘The most limited and flexible alternative to municipal 
amalgamation resides in voluntary arrangements between geographically adjacent 
councils to share resources on an ad hoc basis’ (p. 23). The examples cited include 
skilled staff (environmental experts), capital equipment, IT systems, domestic 
garbage removal and disposal. 
ii. Regional organisations of councils: These are ‘voluntary groupings of spatially 
adjacent councils….ROCs are usually governed by a Board consisting of two 
members from constituent municipalities’ (p. 24). The authors comment that 
continuing engagement can provide wider opportunities to build understanding and 
identify new and emergent opportunities for collaboration that might have occurred 
to no individual council acting alone. 
iii. Area integration or joint board models: This would involve ‘a shared 
administration and operations overseen by a joint board of elected councillor’s 
forme ach of the member municipalities. Member councils retina their political 
independence, thus preserving local democracy, whilst simultaneously merging 
administrative staff and resources into a single enlarged bureau (p. 24-25). 
 
iv. Virtual local government: This model of local government ‘would consist of two 
main elements. Firstly relatively small councils would encompass ejected 
councillors and a small permanent secretariat. They would decide on questions of 
policy formulation and monitor serviced delivery to determine its 
effectiveness…Several small adjacent councils would share a common administrative 
structure or “shared services centre” that would provide the necessary 
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administrative capacity to undertake the policies decided upon by individual 
councils. Service delivery could be contracted out’ (p.25-26). 
v. Agency models: In this model councils would occupy a ‘principal-agent’ 
relationship to state governments. ‘Municipalities would surrender completely 
operational control of these services they direct, but at the same time still enjoy 
political autonomy as elected bodies for a spatially defined jurisdiction. Thus all 
service functions would be run by state government employees with state 
government funds….Elected councils would act as advisory bodies to these state 
agencies charged with determining the specific mix of services over their particular 
geographical jurisdictions. 
vi. Amalgamations: This is noted as the most extreme form of centralisation.  
6. Implications 
The foregoing suggests the timeliness of a shift of governance towards place based 
or regional spatial levels. This is the next logical step in the development of public 
sector designs to strengthen economic and social development. As noted earlier, this 
is wholly consistent with the vision for public sector reform advanced in a number 
of recent official reports, for example at the federal level, in the Moran Review 
(Ahead of the Game, Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government 
Administration, March 2010); and at a state level, in the Western Australian 
Economic Audit Committee Report (Putting the Public First, Partnering with the 
Community and Business to Deliver Outcomes, October 2009).  This latter report 
specifically foreshadows the replacement of ‘agencies operating in silos’ with more 
decentralised even individualised arrangements. Both these reports underline the 
profound challenge to centralised processes, cultures and organisational and 
budgetary protocols that are involved in the next iteration of public sector reform. 
But, as British experience attests, the difficulties in translating aspirations into 
practice remain formidable. Many hurdles remain to be surmounted if governance 
in remote Australia is to shift to a place based pattern. 
 
  
